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On October 19th 2003, nearly six months after the outset of the invasion of Iraq by US troops, a 
video was released by al-Qaeda media arm al-Sahab showing Osama bin Laden directly 
threatening Spain. In his words, Spain, then governed by Prime Minister José Maria Aznar from 
the Partido Popular (PP), may face a terrorist attack should Spanish military forces continue to 
be part of the coalition that invaded Iraq[1] and toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Less than 
six months later, on March 11th 2004, Madrid was shaken by coordinated bomb attacks in several 
commuter trains at peak hours, killing 191 people and wounding thousands. The “first well-
known al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist conspiracy in Europe”[2] had been in preparation for years 
thanks to the long-term presence of radical Islamists on Spanish soil. The first jihadist bombing 
on this continent since 9/11[3] seemed to have answered Osama bin Laden’s warning call. Those 
who later claimed responsibility for these attacks pointed out Iraq as their main source of 
motivation. Symbolically the bombings were carried out a few days before the first anniversary 
of Iraq’s invasion. On the national scene, because “terrorism is meant to terrify”[4] and affect an 
audience, terrorists clearly intended to affect the outcome of the national general elections 
scheduled three days later. The Madrid terrorists were not self-starters, nor were they members of 
al-Qaeda who had performed an oath of allegiance to bin Laden. Instead, they were mostly first-
generation immigrants from Northern Africa or the Near East who had been settled in Spain for 
years, had decent jobs and for some of them wives and children[5]. The setting up of the Madrid 
bombings was an illustration of the rising context of the contemporary jihadist movement, 
targeting a country and blaming it for what was happening thousands of kilometres away. This 
example is highly valuable to describe the continuously evolving nature of the jihadist movement 
up to now. 
A splinter group within Islamism
The contemporary jihadist movement, be it nicknamed “leaderless jihad”[6], “jihadi 
international”[7], “neojihadism”[8] or the “global social movement”[9], has progressively 
broken away from modern Islamism as embodied by Hasan al-Banna[10], Sayyid Qutb, 
Mawdudi or Ayatollah Khomeini. Islamism was conceptualised as a political ideology that aimed 
to Islamise society and state through the enforcement of sharia and to revive the value of Islam 
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as a cornerstone of socio-political life[11]. By the time Islam had become a powerful rallying 
tool to oppose governments, most Muslim countries had secular and nationalist regimes such as 
Egypt, Iraq or even Indonesia[12]. In the wake of the successive waves of independence in the 
second half of the twentieth century, radical Islam progressively affected other Muslim countries. 
Over the last thirty years, radical Islamist groups have extensively referred to the concept of 
jihad. Jihad has increasingly been conceived by these groups as armed struggle wherever 
Muslims are oppressed. Islam is not a monolithic block[13], like Islamism and its various 
subcategories[14]. There has been growing disagreement and opposition between the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, a socio-political mass organisation that has engaged in politics when not 
banned by successive Egyptian regimes, and Salafi-jihadist groups such al-Qaeda or Algerian 
Islamic Armed Group (GIA)[15]. The opposition lies on various points that nurture heated debate 
within Islamist circles, and illustrates perfectly that a wide array of schools of thought exists in 
political Islam. Indeed, mainly symbolised by the showdown between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and al-Qaeda, disagreements lie in issues such as democracy, takfir (declaring Muslims to be 
apostates), or the carrying out of indiscriminate violence towards civilians on American and 
European soils[16]. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned the 9/11 attacks, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi’s call to kill Shia in Iraq and more generally al-Qaeda terrorist agenda[17]. The fact that 
al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri went online in April 2008 to answer questions and 
criticise the Muslim Brotherhood[18] strikingly shows that, within a broad Islamist movement 
united by the promotion of a pro-Islamist political agenda,  tactics and strategies differ highly 
from one organisation to another. 
Jihadism in its current form is not homogenous either. Most jihadist groups are of Salafi-
Wahhabi tradition, an extremist branch of Sunni Islam that is known for its “selectively literal 
interpretation of [Islam’s] sacred texts”[19]. It is essential to bear in mind that the Salafi 
movement is heterogeneous and made up of different factions and schools of thought. As 
illustrated by Quintan Wiktorowicz, “the Salafi movement […] reflects a broad array of positions 
regarding issues related to politics and violence”[20]. Particularly, three different factions are to 
be distinguished within Salafism: “purists” who are nonviolent, do not engage in politics and 
who focus on da’wa and religious education; “politicos” who “emphasize the application of the 
Salafi creed to the political arena”[21]; and jihadis favouring violence to establish Islamic states
[22]. Nevertheless, all factions share common beliefs such as the concept of tawhid, or the unity 
and uniqueness of God. They unanimously reject religious innovation and interpretation, and 
consider the Koran and Sunna to be the only legitimate sources of law. Referred to as aqida, this 
“common religious creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of tawhid and ardent 
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rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire”[23]. Besides this, there is a common 
rejection of Western culture, and a willingness to avoid interactions with non-believers[24]. 
Where factions disagree is on the context and the interpretation of contemporary affairs, also 
illustrated by the words of a Jordanian jihadi leader, “the split is not in thought; it is in 
strategy”[25].
The contemporary jihadist movement does not follow the legacy of modern Islamism and is in 
fact a violent and “extremist splinter group within Islamism”[26] that makes jihad a necessary 
and individual task. According to Petter Nesser, jihadist terrorists:
see terrorism as a legitimate and necessary means of struggle in a campaign aiming to: 1. 
Re-Islamize the Muslim world by toppling local regimes they accuse of having become 
too secular and too dependent on the West, and, 2. Rid Muslim lands of Western 
influences[27]. 
Indeed, jihadists have been fighting two enemies at the same time, the “near enemy”[28] and the 
“far enemy”. The near enemy was until recent times the most important target in the eyes of 
Islamists. However, the gradual failure to topple secular regimes has led them to embrace a more 
international type of struggle.
The Afghan catalyst
The Salafi-Wahhabi jihadist movement is particularly embodied by al-Qaeda[29], and a wide 
array of associated groups across the world. Members of these extremist groups were galvanised 
by the defensive jihad in Afghanistan when thousands of foreign fighters came to this 
mountainous country to fight the Soviet forces and defend what they perceived as a collective 
duty to protect their brothers of Islam. Despite a relatively poor role in defeating the Soviet 
military, the ‘Afghan Arabs’ boasted about having successfully brought to its knees one of the 
world’s two superpowers. While it united mujahideen in the 1980s, its aftermath led to heated 
debates within jihadist circles regarding the tactics and the strategy to embrace for the future[30]. 
Some Afghan veterans brought the experience and taste of jihad home, to Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Algeria, Bosnia, the West and many more places throughout the Muslim world[31].
Firstly, in today’s era, the jihadist movement would certainly be well described as a global social 
movement that has nurtured radicals around a common ideology. French sociologist Alain 
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Touraine defines a social movement as “an answer either to a threat or a hope that is directly 
linked to the control that a social group has over its capacity to make decisions, to control 
changes and so on”[32]. Following 9/11, the threat of jihadism has spread out, gained a global 
audience, widened the theatre of actions[33] and threatened an increasing number of targets. 
Contemporary jihadism truly defines itself as a global social movement. As Michel Wieviorka 
pointed out in his study of global anti-movements in the globalised age, the preparation of the 
9/11 attacks involved individuals located on four different continents. The 9/11 hijackers, except 
for one, were born in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Four hijackers had socialised in Germany during 
their university education and had formed the Hamburg cell, later moving to the United States in 
order to learn how to fly planes. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda Central had settled in Sudan in the 1990s 
before moving to Afghanistan and setting up training camps for jihadi candidates[34]. The major 
change suffered by the jihadist movement deals with the huge structural shift undergone by al-
Qaeda, the main spokesperson of global jihadism, into a rallying cry for radical Islamists and 
angered Muslims. Secondly, due to the decentralised nature of jihadism, leadership has been 
affected. It has become less centralised[35] and relied on Osama bin Laden , at least until his 
death was announced on May 2nd, 2011, as a strategic leader and a uniting spiritual figurehead 
rather than a military commander that sends direct orders to jihadists on the field. Nonetheless, 
less centralised leadership does not imply ‘leaderless jihad’. Instead, accounts of the most recent 
terrorist attacks carried out in the name of al-Qaeda in its loosest sense since 9/11 suggest they 
were the result of radical local groups and networks linked through friendship, kinship and word 
of mouth contacts rather than the outcomes of individual self-radicalisations. 
The appeal of al-Qaeda ideology: a driver of franchised jihadism
Following increasing contacts and collaborations between al-Qaeda and like-minded groups in 
the 1990s, the contemporary jihadist movement evolved into a more decentralised and fluid 
network. Jihadist groups have undergone a severe crackdown on their operational base since 9/11 
but have managed to cope with it well. As Jason Burke asserts, “al-Qaeda has become more 
lethal as an ideology than as an organisation”[36]. As a “vanguard”[37] of Islamist international 
terrorism, al-Qaeda symbolises the evolution of the jihadist threat in the post-9/11 environment. 
In this new era, there is no central hub that serves as the main operational link between cells. 
Instead, cells do not cooperate with each other and do not generally know about the existence of 
other cells so as to reduce the likelihood of getting the whole picture if one cell is broken down. 
Consequently, “having no ‘hub’ to answer” contributes to minimise the impact of the destruction 
of individual cells on the organization as a whole”[38].
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Al-Qaeda, from a hierarchical organisation to the vanguard of jihadist terrorism
First of all, as a major player within the jihadist movement, al-Qaeda has transformed itself from 
a hierarchical terrorist organisation into something that has more to do with an appealing 
ideology than a structured paramilitary organisation. Before 9/11, jihadist attacks such as the 
1998 East Africa embassy bombings and the 2000 USS Cole in Aden were directly linked to the 
core al-Qaeda spiritual and military leadership based in Afghanistan. Those who had set up the 
operations were al-Qaeda operatives who followed orders of the al-Qaeda shura, the 
organisation’s decision-making body. At that time, jihadism had a clear command-and-control 
apparatus emanating from the top leadership. Besides, between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan provided al-Qaeda with a safe haven for jihadist leadership. Meanwhile, 
about an estimated 20,000 estimated jihadists trained in al-Qaeda camps[39]. The loss of the 
Afghan safe haven following the wave of US bombings from October 2001[40] put al-Qaeda as 
an organisation under great pressure. Financial assets were frozen, training camps were 
destroyed, and militants as well as senior al-Qaeda members were tracked down, captured or 
killed. Al-Qaeda has survived the capture or death of “80% of its global leadership 
structure”[41], such as military chief Mohammed Atef[42], Khalid Sheikh Mohammed[43], and 
al-Qaeda-Jemaah Islamiyah operative Hambali[44]. The organisation has proved to be highly 
resilient[45] and has successfully turned into a mass social movement attracting thousands of 
radicalised Muslims across the world. Indeed, the persistence of al-Qaeda as a terrorist threat 
does not lie in its military capabilities, which have been greatly hampered since 2001. Rather, it 
goes well beyond these and deals with the attractiveness of jihadism to extremists, making al-
Qaeda just part of a broader extremist Salafi-Wahhabi movement[46].
The globalisation of jihadist militancy
Owing to this new hostile international security context where most Western and non-Western 
states adopt a tough stance against terrorism, the form of jihadist terrorism has become more 
complex to deal with. While jihadist militancy remained mainly local and confined to national 
boundaries in the 1990s, jihadism over the last ten years seems to have moved beyond borders 
thanks to increasing cooperation between associated groups. Global jihadism advocates were 
able to accomplish what had failed in the 1990s in local jihads such as in Algeria and Bosnia[47], 
that is to say, the submission of local conflicts in which Islam plays a part to a global narrative 
that puts Islam at the core. Back in the 1990s, local jihadist groups had waged war on their 
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national governments but had been reluctant to join al-Qaeda’s global struggle. These 
unsuccessful local jihads and “the subsequent failure to establish an Islamic state in a given 
country”[48] may have “pushed the Islamists to go ‘global’”[49]. What can be said is that Osama 
bin Laden became a uniting point in jihadist militancy by gathering a large number of terrorist 
groups into his sphere of influence. Jihadist groups have adopted brand-new names that 
symbolically refer to the allegiance they pledged to the al-Qaeda agenda[50], such as al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers and even al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algerian-based terrorist group formerly called Salafi Group for 
Call and Combat (GSPC)[51]. Leaders of these organisations swore their allegiance to Osama 
bin Laden, al-Qaeda and their strategic objectives. In his analysis of the GSPC as a “glocal 
terrorist organisation”[52], Jean-Luc Marret shows how internal debate within this group sparked 
tensions between on the one hand, those who wanted to keep the struggle local and, on the other 
hand, those who advocated going global. The contemporary jihadist movement has evolved 
thanks to the growing appeal of al-Qaeda ideology and personal links between high-profile 
terrorists. This naming illustrates the franchising of jihadism in the “age of networked 
terrorism”[53]. This mix of ideology and individuals has made the jihadist threat successful in its 
attempt to go global. Indeed, al-Qaeda and other extremist terrorist groups have all found 
common grounds to subscribe to this mutually beneficial relationship. By doing so, al-Qaeda 
offsets its operational disability to carry out another large-scale attack[54] and has increasingly 
relied on various affiliated terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba 
or other European terrorist networks. Al-Qaeda, as a label, provided all these movements with 
the global audience they were looking for. It increases “public awareness”[55] of groups who are 
willing to publicise their cause.  It is particularly relevant regarding the complicated relationship 
between terrorism and the media sphere. Because al-Qaeda-related terrorism has been, in 
general, defined as the most serious non-state threat to governments[56] lately, subscribing to al-
Qaeda’s worldwide agenda has given jihadists the opportunity to hit the headlines because of the 
media’s attraction towards a “dramatizing effect”[57]. By the same token, the vanguard of 
jihadism benefited from this cooperation by claiming responsibility for the attack once it had 
already happened. Al-Qaeda strives to retrieve the political message sent by the terrorist attack 
and confer retrospectively its approval or refusal. The case of Nigerian ‘underpants bomber’ 
Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab may well fit the description of al-Qaeda’s willingness to bless the 
failed plot. Marc Sageman’s following words illustrate this trend: 
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Their [adherents’] official acceptance into al-Qaeda comes after the fact, […] al-Qaeda 
Central does not know who its followers are, and is reduced to accepting them after the 
adherents declare themselves in an act of terrorism[58]. 
This structural shift in the jihadist movement was made possible because al-Qaeda and Osama 
bin Laden had managed to create “a narrative”[59]. According to French scholar Olivier Roy:
The success of Osama bin Laden is not to have established a modern and efficient 
Islamist political organisation, but to have invented a narrative that could allow rebels 
without a cause to connect with a cause[60]. 
The “glocal” organisational structure of contemporary jihadism
The jihadist movement has been torn between globalism and localism. Nowadays, it seems that 
the tendency is leaning towards globalism but it is not an entirely pure global trend. Rather, we 
should adopt what Zygmunt Bauman conceptualises as “glocalisation”. The contemporary 
jihadist movement fits the definition of a social movement given by Brian Jackson, who asserts 
that a social movement is “a group of people with a common ideology who try together to 
achieve certain general goals”[61], well. Despite being broad, this definition illustrates how 
today’s jihadism has evolved – the original al-Qaeda network, by uniting around an openly 
violent ideology, into “ad-hoc terrorist networks, imitators, emulators and a strategic union of 
like-minded companies”[62]. Assuming that the globalisation of jihadism has reduced the 
importance of leadership may be misleading. The new face of contemporary jihadism still 
depends on leadership at some point and “it would be wrong to conclude that the central al-
Qaeda organization is no longer a threat”[63].
From the end of a clear command-and-control leadership to a divided and decentralised 
leadership
Although Osama bin Laden gave the 9/11 hijackers his approval to go ahead with their plans, one 
cannot but notice that nowadays the jihadist movement goes well beyond him and al-Qaeda in 
terms of operational leadership and spiritual guidance. What Western and Muslim countries have 
dealt with for the last ten years differs from an organisation with a genuine command-and-
control apparatus assessing targets, providing funds and carrying out the attack. Contemporary 
jihadism has shaken a large number of countries. The choice of targets has diversified, ranging 
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from police stations and embassies in Pakistan, religious buildings in Djerba to hotels in Jakarta, 
oil pipelines in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or public transport in Madrid and London. In the same 
period of time, terrorist plots were foiled in Singapore, Scotland and Canada, and thousands of 
jihadist sympathisers were arrested in a dozen countries[64]. Clearly, post-9/11 jihadism does not 
rely on a small number of leaders, so “the death or incarceration of [its] leadership and severe 
losses to [its] membership […] is not terminal to [its] struggle”[65]. The persistence of al-Qaeda 
as a common narrative has succeeded because leadership does not solely lie on the shoulders of 
high-profile international terrorists. Rather than a global one, leadership has become more local 
and fragmented at the operational level.
However, strategic leadership rested upon the shoulders and aura of Osama bin Laden, who, 
despite having been described as a modest and soft-spoken man by Western journalists[66], was 
an essential figurehead. Leadership within contemporary jihadism still matters, hence the limited 
ability of Internet self-radicalised individuals to go ahead with their self-organised plans. 
Leadership has expanded thanks to the use of the Internet[67], which has proven to be an 
efficient recruiting tool for de-territorialised jihadists - individuals that will cross the violence 
threshold based on an array of overseas events. Abu Musab al-Suri’s plan is to urge would-be 
jihadists to train autonomously wherever they can in order to create “a system, not an 
organisation”[68]. Examples of “autonomous jihad”[69] are to be found in the cases of self-
proclaimed cell leaders Abdul Nacer Benbrika in Australia and Mohammed Siddique Khan. 
Local imam in a Melbourne suburb, Benbrika was a “spiritual sanctioner”[70] of both Melbourne 
and Sydney cells, whose targets were official government buildings and a nuclear plant[71]. 
Trends in autonomous jihad are symbolised by Benbrika’s own sanction of a suicide attack after 
the question was asked by a cell member[72]. In Khan’s case, his decision to visit Pakistan[73] 
and engage in training with extremist groups in 2004 and 2005 illustrates his commitment to 
jihad and consequently his leadership within the four-man commando. These individuals “are not 
‘name-brand’ terrorists or part of any known terrorist group” but rather “are like-minded 
individuals”[74] who were inspired by al-Qaeda, radicalised, indoctrinated and who 
progressively embraced jihad. 
The influence of jihadist leadership on European soil
Many terrorist attacks were claimed to be carried out by self-starters, such as the London 
bombers or the murderer of controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Further evidence 
showed a much deeper commitment to the global jihadist cause and decentralised leadership. 
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Mohammed Bouyeri, van Gogh’s murderer, belong to the Hofstad Group, a Dutch jihadist group 
led by Syrian radical preacher Abu Khatib[75]. The very same group had plans to bomb 
Amsterdam international airport and government buildings[76]. The London bombers were all 
British citizens educated within the framework of the British system. Contacts with Pakistani 
groups were easily made through family acquaintances, given that cell leader Mohammed 
Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer were of Pakistani descent and still maintained close links 
with their relatives in Pakistan. These two individuals kept contact with extremists in Pakistan 
and the UK “up until the attack itself”[77]. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that these attacks 
were solely grounded in a European context. To a certain extent, it shows how global the jihadist 
movement has become. British-born citizens[78] bombed their own country and killed their 
fellow citizens, blaming them for their indirect involvement in the killing of thousands of 
innocent Iraqis. The issue of leadership in this case clearly shows a cell leader, Mohammed 
Siddique Khan, an influential person, leading young radicals in their early twenties. More 
generally, dealing with the leadership of the contemporary jihadist movement has become as 
complex as dealing with the global jihadist ideology. Leadership has become more diffuse, 
whether it is operational, ideological, or due to the charisma of an individual. Osama bin Laden’s 
success was grounded on his ability to co-opt like-minded terrorist groups and also to inspire a 
certain number of radical individuals or religious authorities to embrace his violent agenda and 
ideology. Since 9/11 and the structural change undergone by al-Qaeda into the franchising of 
Islamist terrorism, authority in the jihadist movement has been divided. Leadership and authority 
do not solely emanate from high-profile terrorists but also from radical imams who have 
extensive links with extremist groups overseas in Pakistan, Iraq or the Maghreb. In all instances 
of jihadism in post-9/11 Europe, “the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the 
Islamist terrorists”[79].
Osama bin Laden, a uniting guide rather than a military leader
Until early May 2011, Osama bin Laden remained a figurehead of the jihadist movement, even 
though authority and leadership have become less personalised. In a certain way, and despite the 
fact that contemporary jihadism does not solely deal with interpersonal links, Osama bin Laden 
gained a highly charismatic profile within the movement, making him a naturally powerful 
leader. His videos and statements still resonate in the ears, hearts and minds of extremists and 
sympathisers. Following the announcement of his death , the various online testimonies aired by 
sympathisers and jihadist websites revealed that bin Laden strongly mattered and that his death, 
in one way or another, is a watershed[80]. Even if al-Qaeda can no longer conduct a large-scale 
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terrorist attack, “al-Qaeda leaders continue to highlight potential targets and transmit operational 
directives”[81]. Terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia[82] and the Madrid bombings occurred months 
after Osama bin Laden had himself threatened those countries with the likelihood of a bombing. 
Kinship and friendship as a first step into global jihad
Furthermore, increasing evidence shows that friendship, kinship and word of mouth contacts are 
becoming an increasingly essential feature of the contemporary jihadist movement’s 
organisational structure. Further police investigations in the wake of terrorist attacks have 
unveiled the very nature of these “home-grown” networks, especially in Europe. In the case of 
the Madrid bombings and Theo van Gogh’s killing, initial descriptions of “self-financed, self-
sufficient and self-radicalised”[83] cells turned out to be partially wrong or at least too short-
sighted. The Madrid bombers were not home-grown terrorists. Mostly from Moroccan, Algerian, 
and Syrian backgrounds[84], these extremists were in fact all linked though the Abu Dahdah[85] 
network.  As an al-Qaeda operative in Spain[86], he had extensive contacts with European 
jihadist circles in London such as influential al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri[87] and al-
Ansar editor Abu Qatada[88]. Further evidence shows that this network was also closely 
collaborating with the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group[89], itself linked to jihadists in 
Europe, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan[90]. This complex web of links shows the global aspect 
that shapes the jihadist movement. Terrorist cells in Europe in the post-9/11 environment are 
defined by Jordan, Manas and Horsburgh as “grassroot jihadist networks”[91]. In their view, 
these networks embody “individuals that operate within the country that they reside and share the 
strategic objectives of the Global Jihad Movement (GJM) but do not formally belong to the ‘Al-
Qaeda organisation’ or other associated groups”[92]. Unquestionably they are part of “a wider 
hierarchical organization, and depend on the directives of that organization at strategic and 
operational levels”[93] and embrace this jihadist narrative. This definition of “grassroot jihadist 
networks” fits the descriptions of the Madrid bombers’ network, the 7/7 London suicide bombers 
and the Hofstad Group well. These individuals, either European-born or European immigrants, 
were radicalised in Europe through friendship and kinship. Indeed, political violence and 
terrorism may not be embraced by a personal move towards radicalism. One’s grievances, 
whether social, religious, political or economic, have to be framed into a narrative that resonates. 
All potential causes of terrorism, such as anger, political frustration, feelings of humiliation or 
despair may impact on one’s behaviour, particularly if these beliefs are commonly shared and 
felt. Terrorism clearly is a group process. Framing terrorism into a “group adventure”[94] may 
contribute to an understanding of how individuals turned their backs on their own societies or 
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their countries of residence. For instance, an account of the formation of the Hofstad Group in 
the Netherlands indicates that most group members originated from the Rif Valley in Northern 
Morocco. An analysis of the Madrid network members similarly illustrates that the group grew 
by word of mouth. Some members, radical Muslims, encouraged their friends who felt some 
degree of alienation to join this terrorist cell[95]. In the meantime, European governments 
conducted hundreds of arrests of would-be jihadists across the continent[96], showing that the 
continent is not immune to the threat of “Europe’s angry Muslims,”[97] in Robert Leiken’s 
words. The same thing can be said about the deadliest terrorist cell that emerged from Europe, 
the Hamburg cell. In the late 1990s, Hamburg was the place where Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah 
and Marwan al-Shehhi met, socialised and were radicalised during their university years. In the 
case of those three 9/11 pilots, they had become involved in radicalism in Europe, and sought al-
Qaeda guidance. They, typically, offered al-Qaeda their skills, not the other way around. 
Therefore, it can be said that within the contemporary jihadist movement “the main groups did 
not recruit individuals. Rather, they entered the movement”[98].
This divided type of leadership, social bonds between individuals and Osama bin Laden’s 
charismatic authority have characterised the evolution of the jihadist movement towards a highly 
decentralised structure after the 9/11 attacks. Contemporary jihadism on the global scale as it has 
been previously defined differs from the hierarchical terrorist organisation that directly planned 
the 1998 East Africa embassy attacks, the USS Cole attack in Aden and 9/11. Over the last 
decade, the franchising of jihadism has been embodied by the growing use of affiliated terrorist 
groups or less importantly inspired sympathisers who crossed the violence threshold to carry out 
deadly acts on behalf of this extremist, violent and deviant ideology. In other words and despite 
the post-9/11 global crackdown on al-Qaeda leaders and operatives, al-Qaeda has managed to 
maintain its resilience in the international system by subcontracting its deadly acts of terror to 
individuals and groups ready to take up the challenge on its behalf. Bouyeri, Khan, the Madrid 
bombers, Indonesian and Pakistani terrorists among many others all put into practice bin Laden 
and Zawahiri’s various calls for indiscriminate violence against their numerous identified 
enemies, ranging from Western military personnel to Muslim and non-Muslim innocent civilians. 
To conclude, leadership in the contemporary jihadist movement has been dispersed well beyond 
its most visible spokespersons like late Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. It has become 
more elusive to deal with. As a consequence, the complex structure of contemporary jihadism 
has reinforced its resilience and made the fight against jihadist violence more difficult for 
governments, security departments and intelligence agencies. The fact that leadership still 
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matters shows that at some point hierarchy and personal authority remain a critical feature of the 
jihadist movement too. Despite its highly decentralised nature, today’s global jihadism still 
requires leadership so that the movement’s followers can move forward with their plans and 
fulfil the agenda. Should Osama bin Laden and the extremist ideology he stood for stop being an 
inspirational force for radicals, campaigns of terrorist violence in the name of jihad could 
possibly wane in the medium term. Now that the ten-year-long manhunt for the capture of 
Osama bin Laden came to an abrupt end, the issue of leadership within the jihadist movement 
has become all the more essential. Still regarded as an operational success, the targeted killing of 
Osama bin Laden has now widened the window of opportunity for commentaries and predictions 
about the next command-and-control structure that al-Qaeda is likely to adopt. Despite it is too 
early to draw some definite conclusions, what now needs to be discussed in the coming weeks 
and months are the possible scenarios[99]. The death of Osama bin Laden is not synonymous to 
the end of contemporary jihadism, as hierarchy in al-Qaeda did not essentially matter as much as 
it would for other traditional terrorist organisations that suffered a clear decline after the killing 
or the arrest of their leader, such as Shoko Asahara in Aum Shinrikyo. Nevertheless, this targeted 
killing, after dozens of senior al-Qaeda operatives, military commanders and militants were 
arrested or killed over the last decade, symbolises the loss of impetus taken by contemporary 
jihadism.  Whether al-Qaeda central has the ability to perform a transfer of leadership to a new 
leader in order to survive his founder’s death is still unknown and hard to guess. The two most 
visible scenarios that might emerge for the future of the jihadist movement depend on the view 
one has about global jihad, as represented summarily by the 2008 debate between Marc Sageman 
and Bruce Hoffman. Thus, from an al-Qaeda central perspective, the next phase of jihadism 
depends on the possibility for al-Qaeda to name a new leader, such as bin Laden’s long-time 
deputy and al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri, propaganda chief Abu Yahya al-Libi, or less 
prominent contenders, to continue to send orders and provide general guidance[100]. From a 
more networked approach, the resilience of jihadism will be assessed on whether the seeds of 
terror have sufficiently been diffused among the wide jihadist circle of sympathisers globally to 
sustain the struggle in this post-bin Laden era. 
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